The Bse Inquiry: Return to an Order of the Honourable the House of Commons Dated October 2000 for the Report, Evidence and Supporting P (House of Commons Papers)

The BSE Inquiry was set up to: establish and review the history of the emergence and identification of BSE and variant CJD in the United Kingdom, and of the action taken in response to it up to 20 March 1996; reach conclusions on the adequacy of that response, taking into account the state of knowledge at the time; and to report on these matters to the Government. This executive summary presents the overview of the key findings and conclusions. BSE developed into an epidemic as a consequence of an intensive farming practice - the recycling of animal protein in ruminant feed. The report states that in the years up to March 1996 most of those responsible for responding to the challenge posed by BSE emerge with credit. However, there were a number of shortcomings in the way things were done. The Government took measures to address both the hazard to animal health and human health, but these were not always timely nor adequately implemented and enforced. The Inquiry found that the rigour with which policy measures were implemented for the protection of human health was affected by the belief of many prior to early 1996 that BSE was not a potential threat to human life. The Government was anxious to act in the best interests of human and animal health. To this end it sought and followed the advice of independent scientific experts - sometimes when decisions could have been reached more swiftly and satisfactorily within government. At times officials showed a lack of rigour in considering how policy should be turned into practice, to the detriment of the efficacy of the measures taken, and on occasion the bureaucratic processes resulted in unacceptable delay in giving effect to policy. The report demonstrates that the Government introduced measures to guard against the risk that BSE might be a matter of life and death not merely for cattle but also for humans, but the possibility of a risk to humans was not communicated to the public or to those whose job it was to implement and enforce the precautionary measures. The Inquiry concludes that the Government did not lie to the public about BSE. It believed that the risks posed by BSE to humans were remote. The Government was preoccupied with preventing an alarmist over-reaction to BSE because it believed that the risk was remote. It is stated that the campaign of reassurance was a mistake. When on 20 March 1996 the Government announced that BSE had probably been transmitted to humans, the public felt that they had been betrayed. Confidence in government pronouncements about risk was a further casualty of BSE. Cases of a new variant of CJD (vCJD) were identified by the CJD Surveillance Unit and the conclusion that they were probably linked to BSE was reached as early as was reasonably possible. The link between BSE and vCJD is now clearly established, though the manner of infection is not clear.Phillips, Nicholas is the author of 'The Bse Inquiry: Return to an Order of the Honourable the House of Commons Dated October 2000 for the Report, Evidence and Supporting P (House of Commons Papers)' with ISBN 9780105569862 and ISBN 0105569860.