25962888
9781422319321
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This is the first known effort to apply the game-theory concepts of ¿Pareto improved: & ¿Pareto optimal¿ strategies as well as ¿Nash¿ & ¿preferred¿ equilibriums to the Iraqi conflict. Specifically, this article examines how, through application of game theory to this model, U.S. & coalition forces will ultimately suffer casualties at an increasing rate the longer they remain in Iraq. This will occur because both domestic insurgents (DIs) & indigenous security forces (ISFs) will turn away from attacking each other towards a point of mathematical corruption. At this theoretical point, Amer. & coalition troops will become the target of broad-based DI attacks, with intelligence frequently provided by ISFs. Illustrations.Brightman, Hank J. is the author of 'Nash in Najaf: Game Theory and Its Applicability to the Iraqi Conflict : A Reprint from ¿Air and Space Power Journal¿', published 2008 under ISBN 9781422319321 and ISBN 1422319326.
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