Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army

This book analyses the conduct of the Israel Defence Forces' (IDF) counter-insurgency operations during the two major Palestinian uprisings (1987-1993 and 2000-2005) in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Divided into two parts, the book explores, first, the function and historical background of the IDF, and, second, how the IDF has coped with and adapted to the two Intifadas. Drawing on a variety of sources, it analyses the degree of success experienced by the IDF in adapting its conventional conduct of warfare to the realities of Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict. By examining the way in which the IDF and the Israeli security doctrine were formed and developed over time, the book also explores how far Israeli strategic assumptions, civil-military relations, the organizational culture, command and control structure, and conduct of the IDF have affected its adaptation to the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also provides new insights into how conventional armies struggle with contemporary insurgency. This book will be of much interest to students of low-intensity conflict and counter-insurgency, the Israeli army, the Middle Eastern conflict and strategic studies in general.Catignani, Sergio is the author of 'Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army', published 2008 under ISBN 9780415433884 and ISBN 0415433886.