Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting

Contents Preface To The Paperback Edition Preface Prologue 1. Antecedents from the 1930s 2. The Next Thirty Years 3. An Overview Chapter 1. Transaction Cost Economics 1. Transaction Costs 2. A Cognitive Map of Contract 3. The World of Contract 4. A Simple Contracting Schema 5. Economic Organization of the Company Town 6. Applications 7. Concluding Remarks Chapter 2. Contractual Man 1. Behavioral Assumptions 2. Dimensions 3. The Fundamental Transformation Appendix: Opportunism: A Digression Chapter 3. The Governance of Contractual Relations 1. Contracting Traditions 2. Efficient Governance 3. Uncertainty 4. Measurement 5. The Distribution of Transactions Chapter 4. Vertical Integration: Theory and Policy 1. Technological Determinism 2. A Heuristic Model 3. Further Implications 4. Vertical Merger Guidelines Chapter 5. Vertical Integration: Some Evidence 1. Types of Evidence 2. Mundane Integration 3. Forward Integration into Distribution 4. Lateral Integration 5. Backward Integration 6. Some Remarks About Japanese Manufacture 7. Some Alternative Explanations 8. Concluding Remarks Chapter 6. The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features 1. A Chronic Puzzle 2. Integration of an Owner-Managed Supply Stage 3. Acquisition of a Supply Stage in Which Ownership and Management Are Separated 4. The Costs of Bureaucracy 5. Low-Powered Incentives in Markets 6. Illustrative Examples 7. Concluding Remarks Chapter 7. Credible Commitments I: Unilateral Applications 1. Private Ordering 2. Credible Commitments 3. The Hostage Model 4. Engaging the Supplier 5. Unilateral Trading Applications 6. Schwinn Chapter 8. Credible Commitments II: Bilateral Applications 1. Reciprocity 2. The Hostage Model Extended 3. Petroleum Exchanges 4. Concluding Remarks Chapter 9. The Organization of Work 1. The Radical Account of Hierarchy 2. Transaction Cost Aspects 3. A Comparative Institutional Framework 4. A Comparative Institutional Assessment 5. Power Versus Efficiency 6. Concluding Remarks Chapter 10. The Organization of Labor 1. Central Issues 2. An Abstract Approach 3. Union Organization 4. Problematic Features of Union Organization 5. The Producer Cooperative Dilemma 6. Dignity 7. Concluding Remarks Chapter 11. The Modern Corporation 1. Railroad Organization 2. The M-Form Innovation 3. Applications: Conglomerate and Multinational Enterprise 4. Concluding Remarks Chapter 12. Corporate Governance 1. Background 2. A Contractual Assessment 3. Management as a Constituency 4. Managerial Discretion and Organization Form 5. Concluding Remarks Chapter 13. Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopoly 1. Introduction 2. The Simple Franchise Bidding Scheme 3. Franchise Bidding Elaborated 4. A Case Study 5. Concluding Remarks Appendix: The Oakland CATV Franchise Bidding Experience Chapter 14. Antitrust Enforcement 1. Merger Policy 2. Nonstandard Contracting 3. Strategic Behavior 4. Unresolved Dilemmas 5. Concluding Remarks Chapter 15. Conclusions 1. Transaction Cost Economics 2. Economics 3. Law 4. Organization 5. Postscript BIBLIOGRAPHY AUTHOR INDEX SUBJECT INDEXWilliamson, Oliver E. is the author of 'Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting', published 1987 under ISBN 9780029348215 and ISBN 0029348218.